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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, the interconnection of automotive systems with modern
digital devices oers advanced user experiences to drivers. Elec-
tronic Control Units (ECUs) carry out a multitude of operations
using the insecure Controller Area Network (CAN) bus in automo-
tive Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). erefore, dangerous aacks,
such as disabling brakes, are possible and the safety of passengers
is at risk. In this paper, we present TACAN (Transmier Authenti-
cation in CAN), which provides secure authentication of ECUs by
exploiting the covert channels without introducing CAN protocol
modications or trac overheads (i.e., no extra bits or messages are
used). TACAN turns upside-down the originally malicious concept
of covert channels and exploits it to build an eective defensive
technique that facilitates transmier authentication via a trusted
Monitor Node. TACAN consists of three dierent covert channels
for ECU authentication: 1) Inter-Arrival Time (IAT)-based, leverag-
ing the IATs of CAN messages; 2) oset-based, exploiting the clock
osets of CAN messages; 3) Least Signicant Bit (LSB)-based, con-
cealing authentication messages into the LSBs of normal CAN data.
We implement the covert channels of TACAN on the University
of Washington (UW) EcoCAR testbed and evaluate their perfor-
mance through extensive experiments using real vehicle datasets.
We demonstrate the feasibility of TACAN, highlighting no trac
overheads and aesting the regular functionality of ECUs. In partic-
ular, the bit error ratios are within 0.1% and 0.42% for the IAT-based
and oset-based covert channels, respectively. Furthermore, the
bit error ratio of the LSB-based covert channel is equal to that of a
normal CAN bus, which is 3.1 × 10−7%.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Computer systems organization → Embedded and cyber-
physical systems; •Security and privacy→ Cryptography;
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1 INTRODUCTION
e Controller Area Network (CAN) enables communication among
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) for closed in-vehicle networks [2,
16]. e security of CAN bus is crucial to the functionality and
safety of today’s automobiles and future’s autonomous cars [1, 34].
Since the CAN bus is a broadcast medium without authentication, a
compromised ECU can be used to masquerade as any targeted ECU
by transmiing messages with the forged message ID (masquerade
aack [3]). Modern externally accessible ECUs with additional
connectivity interfaces such as cellular, Wi-Fi or Bluetooth disrupt
the closed in-vehicle network assumption. Consequently, the CAN
bus has shown to be vulnerable to cyber aacks, such as disabled
brakes [3] and remotely controlled steering [30].
Use of cryptographic primitives such as message authentica-
tion is one way to defend against aacks (notably the masquerade
aack) on the CAN bus. However, it can be challenging in prac-
tice due to the low throughput and tight bit budget of the CAN
protocol, and current solutions such as [14, 20, 26, 33] require pro-
tocol modications or introduce trac overheads. An alternative
is to deploy anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
without modifying the CAN protocol [5–7, 25], including timing-
based and voltage-based IDSs. e timing-based IDS in [5] exploits
CAN message periodicity to estimate clock skew as a unique n-
gerprint to detect masquerade aacks. Nevertheless, it was later
shown to be ineective against the cloaking aack that modies the
inter-transmission time to emulate the clock skew of the targeted
ECU [28, 35]. e voltage-based IDSs [6, 7, 17, 24] aempt to nger-
print the aacker through voltage signal characteristics. However,
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Figure 1: Illustration of TACAN. Legitimate ECUs transmit
unique authentication messages that are embedded into the
timing and LSBs of normal CAN messages (e.g., A1, B2, and
C3) using the proposed covert channel methodologies. e
Monitor Node authenticates transmitting ECUs by verifying
the received authentication messages. If the compromised
ECUs cannot generate valid authentication messages, then
the attack will be detected by the Monitor Node.
if the aacker uses IDs that the compromised ECU is allowed to
use under normal conditions, the aack will not be detected.
In this work, we develop TACAN that allows the trusted Monitor
Node (MN) to verify the authenticity of a transmiing ECU and
detect CAN bus anomalies, as illustrated in Figure 1. In TACAN, a
master key is shared between an ECU and the MN for generating
shared session keys. Consistently with [14, 26, 33], we assume that
the keys are stored in the tamper-resistant memory of a security
module such as the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [12]. Each
ECU embeds unique authentication messages into CAN messages
and continuously transmits them through covert channels, which
can be received and veried by the MN.
erefore, if the aacker has no access to the TPM of the tar-
geted ECU, it cannot use the compromised ECU or external device
to generate valid authentication messages, thus causing verica-
tion failures and triggering the alarm at the MN side. Moreover,
TACAN will detect aacks (e.g., Denial-of-Service (DoS) aack)
that interrupt the transmission of CAN messages that are used to
embed the authentication messages. e main benets of using
covert channels for TACAN are that they do not introduce protocol
modications or trac overheads (i.e., extra bits or messages). In
addition, by requiring ECUs to transmit authentication messages
much less frequently than per-message authentication schemes,
TACAN can signicantly reduce the computational burden of the
resource-constrained ECUs.
Contributions: In this paper, we make the following contribu-
tions:
• We identify and exploit covert channels to facilitate ECU
authentication on the CAN bus. Hence, covert channels
are used for security instead of malicious communication.
• We propose TACAN, which consists of a suite of three
covert channels for transmiing authentication messages,
including two timing-based covert channels that modify
the inter-transmission times of CAN messages to aect
the inter-arrival times (IATs) and osets observed by the
MN, and one storage-based covert channel that hides the
information in the LSBs of the data payload of normal CAN
messages.
• We implement the covert channels of TACAN in a real
vehicle testbed (the UW EcoCAR [10]). We also conduct
extensive experiments to demonstrate the feasibility of
such covert channels using two real CAN trac datasets,
the publicly available Toyota dataset [8] and the EcoCAR
dataset. Our results show that the bit error ratios are within
0.1% and 0.42% for the IAT-based and oset-based covert
channels, respectively. e bit error ratio of the LSB-based
covert channel is equal to 3.1 × 10−7%, which is the bit
error ratio of a typical CAN bus.
Organization. e remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews the related work. Section 3 presents our sys-
tem and adversary models. Section 4 presents TACAN. A security
discussion of TACAN is provided in Section 5. Section 6 presents
experimental evaluation. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
Recent experimental studies have demonstrated that an aacker
is able to inltrate in-vehicle ECUs physically or remotely and
mount cyber aacks that would cause potentially life-threatening
consequences by disabling breaks or overriding steering [3, 22].
One way to secure the CAN bus is to deploy anomaly-based IDSs
based on trac analysis (e.g., timing/frequency [15]), entropy [25],
or physical invariants such as clock skew [5, 28] and signal char-
acteristics [6, 7, 17, 24]. While voltage-based IDSs are eective
against ongoing masquerade aackers, they cannot detect a com-
promised ECU before aacks are launched (e.g., a stealthy aacker
may not launch the aack until the car is in drive mode). Moreover,
it has been recently shown in [27] that the extra wires required by
voltage-based IDSs may introduce new aack surfaces.
Researchers have also aempted to add cryptographic primi-
tives such as Message Authentication Code (MAC) to the CAN bus,
including CANAuth [33], LCAP [14], CaCAN [20], and LeiA [26].
Due to the tight bit budget and low throughput of CAN, authen-
tication information is usually embedded into existing CAN mes-
sages (i.e., the ID or data eld) and transmied through additional
CAN messages, thus introducing trac overheads or increasing
the bus load [14, 20, 26]. In this work, we focus on transmier au-
thentication rather than per-message authentication to avoid such
trac overheads. e key novelty of this work is the use of covert
channels, a well-known malicious technique that is converted into
defensive applications for authentication purposes. Compared to
previous authentication schemes, our scheme does not require pro-
tocol modications or introduce extra bits or CAN messages.
In literature, there are two main categories of covert channels:
timing-based and storage-based. In timing-based covert channels,
only the timing of events or trac is modied to share information
between two parties and the contents of data stream remain intact.
e storage-based covert channels hide data in a shared resource
that is not designed for transferring data, e.g., by exploiting reserved
or used elds in the data packet or concealing data in the payload.
Compared to steganography techniques that require some form of
content as cover, the covert channels exploit network protocols as
carrier [36]. In [32], Taylor et al. propose an approach where the
exploitation of covert channel enhances the Modbus/TCP protocol
security for industrial control system applications. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the rst paper that explores covert channels
for automotive CAN buses.
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Table 1: Frequently used notations.
Notation Description
MKi , SKi Master and session keys of ECUi
дi , li Global and local counters of ECUi
T Message period
S Clock skew
ti , ai Transmit and arrival timestamps
ηi Noise in the arrival timesatmp of message i
∆ti Inter-transmission time (ITT) between messages (i − 1) and i
∆ai Inter-arrival time (IAT) between messages (i − 1) and i
∆a¯[i] e i-th sample of averaged ∆ai
δ Deviation (added to ITTs at the transmier side)
L Window length or number of least signicant bits
κ, Γu , Γl Reference level, upper threshold, lower threshold
Am , Af Authentication message, authentication frame
nm , nf , ns Number of bits in Am and Af ; number of silence bits
Oˆk [i] e observed clock oset up to message i in batch k
3 SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODELS
In this section, we present the system (Section 3.1) and adversary
(Section 3.2) models for the CAN bus. A list of frequently used
notations is provided in Table 1.
3.1 System Model
CAN Bus. As a broadcast medium, the CAN bus connects all
ECUs to the same, shared bus line and allows them to transmit any
messages to any ECU and observe all ongoing transmissions. Each
CAN frame (or message) has a set of predened elds, including
notably the Arbitration eld (which includes the message ID) and
the Data eld (up to 8 bytes). More details about the CAN frame
structure are provided in Appendix A.1.
If two (or more) ECUs aempt to transmit messages simultane-
ously, an arbitration scheme based on priority (a smaller message ID
indicates a higher priority) is used to determine which ECU trans-
mits rst. e CAN messages do not have transmit timestamps and
do not support encryption or authentication.
Clock Skew. In automotive CAN, most messages are transmied
periodically as per the local clocks of transmiing ECUs1. Since
there exists no clock synchronization among ECUs, the frequencies
of local clocks are dierent due to clock skew, a physical property
caused by variations in the clock’s hardware crystal.
Let CA(t) be the time reported by clock A and Ctrue (t) = t be
the true time. According to the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [23],
the clock oset of clock A is dened as OA(t) = CA(t) −Ctrue (t),
and the clock skew is the rst derivative of clock oset, i.e., SA(t) =
O ′A(t) = C ′A(t) − 1, which is usually measured in microseconds per
second (µs/s) or parts per million (ppm). In the absence of a true
clock, the relative clock oset and relative clock skew can be dened
with respect to a reference clock.
Timing Model. As illustrated in Figure 2, we let ti be the transmit
time of message i (assuming t0 = 0) and ∆ti = ti − ti−1 be the inter-
transmission time according to the transmier’s clock. If messages
are transmied every T seconds, we have ∆ti = T and ti = iT . e
1In the UW EcoCAR (Chevrolet Camaro), all of the 89 messages with distinct IDs are
periodic with periods ranging from 10 ms to 5 sec. In the Toyota Camry 2010, 39 of
the 42 distinct messages are periodic. In the Dodge Ram Pickup 2010 in [5], all of the
55 distinct messages are periodic. While CAN message periodicity depends on the
manufacturer and the model, the above examples suggest that periodic CAN messages
are very common and even dominant on the CAN bus of commercial automobiles.
TX
RX
Ideal 𝑡" = 0 𝑡% = 𝑡"+ Δ𝑡%
Actual 𝑡%( = 𝑡%− 𝑂% 𝑡+( = 𝑡+ −𝑂+ 	 𝑡-( = 𝑡- −𝑂-
𝑎" = 𝑡"(+𝑑" + 𝑛" 𝑎% = 𝑡%(+	𝑑% + 𝑛% 𝑎+ = 𝑡+(+𝑑+ + 𝑛+ 𝑎- = 𝑡-(+𝑑- + 𝑛-
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Figure 2: Illustration of our timing model.
receiver’s clock is considered as the reference clock. In practice,
there exists a clock skew in the transmier’s clock relative to the
reference clock, which introduces an oset Oi between the two
clocks. erefore, the actual transmit time is t ′i = ti −Oi according
to the reference clock.
While the clock skew may be slowly varying due to factors
including the temperature, the clock skew is almost constant over
a short duration. Given a constant clock skew S , the relationship
between the elapsed time ti at the transmier and the elapsed
time t ′i at the receiver is given by S = (ti − t ′i )/t ′i . Hence, we
have t ′i = ti/(1 + S), and Oi = ti − t ′i = S1+S ti . To account for
oset deviations due to jiers, we model the actual clock oset
Oi =
S
1+S ti + ϵi , where ϵi ’s are assumed to be i.i.d. zero-mean
random variables.
Aer a network delay of di (due to message transmission, propa-
gation, arbitration, and reception) and the zero-mean quantization
noise ni [37], the arrival timestamp of message i is
ai = ti −Oi + di + ni = ti − S1 + S ti + ηi =
1
1 + S ti + ηi , (1)
where ηi = −ϵi + di + ni is the overall noise. Since periodic CAN
messages have constant data lengths over time, it is reasonable to
assume constant-mean network delays, i.e., E[di ] = d . Hence, ηi ’s
can be modeled as i.i.d. random variables with a mean of d and a
variance of σ 2η .
3.2 Adversary Model
We consider an adversary who aims to inltrate the CAN bus and
launch stealthy aacks without being detected. We assume that
the adversary can passively monitor and observe all ongoing CAN
transmissions. In addition, it has full knowledge of the deployed
covert channels and can also observe all authentication messages
that are being transmied. In reality, there are usually two ways of
gaining unauthorized access to the CAN bus: 1) compromise an in-
vehicle ECU either physically or remotely [3], or 2) plug an external
device (a malicious ECU) into the CAN bus [18]. We assume that
the adversary has no access to the keys stored in the TPM of the
compromised ECU and other legitimate ECUs.
e adversary can use the compromised or malicious ECU to
perform three basic aacks: 1) suspension, 2) injection, and 3)
masquerade aacks, as considered in [5, 21, 28]. As illustrated in
Figure 3(a), a suspension aacker prevents the compromised ECU
from transmiing certain messages, while an injection aacker can
fabricate and inject CAN messages of arbitrary choices of message
ID, content, and timing, as sketched in Figure 3(b). Injection aacks
can lead to more sophisticated aacks such as the DoS aack [15]
and the bus-o aack [4]. In the (stealthy) masquerade aack,
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Figure 3: ree representative attacks on the CAN bus.
the adversary will need to compromise two ECUs – one is weakly
compromised (acting as the strong aacker who can only launch
suspension aacks) and the other one is fully compromised (acting
as the strong aacker who can both launch suspension and injection
aacks). In the example in Figure 3(c), the adversary suspends
the weakly compromised ECU2 from transmiing message 0xB2
and uses the fully compromised ECU1 to inject messages 0xB2
claiming to originate from ECU2. As compared to the suspension
and injection aack, it is much more dicult to detect the stealthy
masquerade aack.
4 TACAN
In this section, we provide details on the TACAN architecture
(Section 4.1) and introduce our transmier authentication protocol
(Section 4.2). We then present three covert channels for transmiing
authentication messages: 1) IAT-based (Section 4.3), 2) oset-based
(Section 4.4), and 3) LSB-based (Section 4.5).
4.1 TACAN architecture
As shown in Figure 4, TACAN consists of in-vehicle ECUs and
a trusted MN connected to the same CAN bus. We assume that
the MN is pre-installed by the manufacturer during production
and requires direct physical access by authorized parties (e.g., an
authorized repairs shop) to prevent potential tampering and com-
promises. We further assume that the deployed covert channels are
pre-congured during production or re-congured during main-
tenance, so that the one-way communication of authentication
information from ECUs to the MN can be successful established.
Similar to [14, 26, 33], a master key (MK) is assumed to be pre-
shared between each ECU and the MN, which is stored in the TPM.
Updating of MKs (e.g., when adding or replacing an ECU) should
again require direct physical access by authorized parties to the
involved ECUs. e procedure of key updating is outside the scope
of this paper. During operation, Each ECU will generate a session
key (SK) from the MK and a global counter and further use it to
generate authentication messages. We describe the transmier
authentication protocol in more detail in the following section.
CAN Bus
…
A1 10..01 B2 11..01 01..10C3
A1: 10..01
B2: 11..01
C3: 01..10
Verification:ECU1 ECU2 ECUnTPM
Master key
Global counter
Session key
Auth. msg
MN
…
Figure 4: Illustration of TACAN architecture and the trans-
mitter authentication protocol.
4.2 Transmitter Authentication Protocol
Inspired by the work in [26], the MN performs unidirectional au-
thentication of each transmiing ECU. e parameters used by
TACAN for the n ECUs are summarized as follows:
• e master key MKi with i ∈ {1, ...,n} is a pre-shared key
between ECUi and the MN, which is securely stored in the
TPMs of both parties.
• e session key SKi with i ∈ {1, ...,n} is used to generate
authentication messages for ECUi .
• e local counter li with i ∈ {1, ...,n} is an incremental
value that stores the number of transmied authentica-
tion messages for ECUi . is value is contained in the
authentication message.
• e global counter дi with i ∈ {1, ...,n} represents a value
updated on specic circumstances (e.g., car ignition, li
overow) and it is used to generate SKi .
We assume that both SKi and дi are stored in the TPM so that an
aacker cannot tamper with them and launch replay aacks.
Session Key Generation. Each ECUi stores its own master key
MKi , and the MN stores the master keys of all ECUs. e session
key for the n ECUs is generated from MKi and дi as follows:
SKi = HMAC(MKi ,дi ), for i ∈ {1, ...,n},
where HMAC(·) refers to the Hash-based Message Authentication
Code algorithm [19]. It is possible to use dierent hashing algo-
rithms for HMAC (e.g., HMAC-SHA256) to meet the desired security
requirements.
Every time SKi is updated, li will be reset to zero. On the receiver
side, the MN uses the same MKi and дi to compute the correspond-
ing SKi for ECUi . Counter synchronization is performed when дi is
incremented. Since authentication message verication failures can
be caused by de-synchronization of counters, a re-synchronization
procedure may be performed. More details are provided in [26].
Authentication Message Generation. ECUi rst increments li
and then computes the authentication message Am as follows:
Am = li | |HMAC(SKi , li ),
where “| |” denotes bit string concatenation. For the scope of our
work, we assume that all the parameters (keys and counters) con-
ceived for TACAN are binary values. As we can see, Am is not
related to any normal CAN message and merely serves as an iden-
tier for ECUi .
As for li , a 24-bit counter can last for 46+ hours for a 10-ms
message even in per-message authentication, which is sucient
for our transmier authentication protocol that transmits Am at
a much smaller frequency. Implementations of TACAN are free
to use whichever hashing algorithm for HMAC and sizes of keys
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Figure 5: Illustration of timing-based covert channels.
that are deemed strong enough. Instead of transmiing the entire
digest that are usually hundreds of bits long, the transmier may
truncate each digest to several bits to reduce the transmission time
(e.g., using the least signicant 8 bits or XORing all bytes together
to create a condensed 8-bit version of the digest, as in [20, 31]).
4.3 IAT-Based Covert Channel
Figure 5 illustrates two timing-based covert channels for periodic
CAN messages, in which the transmiing ECU embeds the au-
thentication message into the ITTs of CAN messages, which can
be extracted from the IATs or osets by the MN. By verifying the
received authentication message, the MN can authenticate the trans-
mier. In this section, we present the IAT-based covert channel.
Observations. According to our timing model in Eq. (1), the ob-
served IAT between messages (i − 1) and i is given by
∆ai = ai − ai−1 = 11 + S ∆ti + (ηi − ηi−1). (2)
Since almost all CAN messages are periodic (i.e., ∆ti = T ), the IATs
have a mean ofE[∆ai ] = T /(1+S) and a variance of Var(∆ai ) = 2σ 2η .
In practice, clock skews are usually very small (in the order of 100s
of ppm). Hence, we have κ = E[∆ai ] ≈ T , where κ is considered as
the reference level for IATs2.
From Eq. (2), we can see that an amount of deviation δ in ITTs
will lead to a corresponding change of δ/(1+S) in IATs, which may
be easily observed by the receiver when variances in IATs are small.
In the case of large variances in IATs, the receiver may compute
the running average to smooth out the noise, that is,
∆a¯[i] = 1
L
L−1∑
j=0
∆ai+j =
1
1 + S
©­« 1L
L−1∑
j=0
∆ti+j
ª®¬ + 1L (ηi+L−1 − ηi−1),
where L is the window length. rough the running average, the
variance of IATs can be reduced signicantly by a factor of L2.
Note that due to the existence of 1/L in the bracket, the amount
of deviation δ needs to be added to L consecutive ITTs in order to
maintain the same level of changes in observed IATs.
As an example, we plot the IAT distributions of message 0x020
(T = 0.01 sec) from the Toyota dataset [8] in Figure 6. When
δ = 0.02T = 2 · 10−4 sec is added to or subtracted from IATs (to
simulate operations at the transmier assuming negligible clock
skew eects), the three clusters (representing a bit 0 or a bit 1 or
neither) cannot be separated from each other (Figure 6(a)), which
may lead to bit errors at the receiver side. In contrast, with the
running average of L = 4, the clusters are clearly distinguishable
2In the case of very large clock skews, the reference level κ needs to be calibrated
oine from the training dataset.
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Figure 6: Example of IAT distributions of message ID=0x020
from the Toyota dataset (a) without running average (L = 1)
and (b) with running average (L = 4).
(Figure 6(b)) and can be separated through thresholding. e above
observations motivate our design of IAT-based covert channels.
Embedding Am into ITTs. Given Am of nm bits, the transmier
rst constructs an authentication frameAf by insertingns/2 silence
bits before and aer Am . e main purpose of silence bits (seing
δ = 0) is to maintain the reference level of IATs and signal the start
and end of Am . Hence, the total length of Af is nf = nm + ns . For
instance, if Am = 0101 and ns = 2, we have Af = 0101 . Each bit
i is modulated into L consecutive ITTs as follows,
∆tj =

T + δ , if bi = 0,
T − δ , if bi = 1,
T , else,
where j ∈ [iL, (i + 1)L).
Extracting Am from IATs. On the receiver side, the MN records
the arrival timestamps for the targeted messages and computes the
IATs. It then performs running average with the right choice of
L to obtain {∆a¯[i]}. Since each bit is repeated for L consecutive
ITTs, the receiver needs to sample {∆a¯[i]} every L values. Let
the sampling oset be τ and the j-th sample be ∆a¯[jL + τ ]. If τ is
correctly chosen, the total distance between each modulated sample
and the reference level (κ) should be maximized, i.e.,
τ ∗ = arg max
τ
∑
j
|∆a¯[jL + τ ] − κ | .
en the receiver can convert the sampled values to bits through
thresholding as follows,
bˆj =

0, if ∆a¯[jL + τ ∗] > Γu ,
1, if ∆a¯[jL + τ ∗] < Γl ,
, else ,
(3)
where Γl = κ − δ/2 and Γu = κ + δ/2 are the lower and upper
thresholds, respectively, κ ≈ T , and “ ” is the silence bit. Aer that,
the output bits are concatenated and then split at the silence bits to
obtain Am .
Note that in order to establish a reliable IAT-based covert channel,
the parameters including L and δ need to be pre-shared between
the transmiing ECU and the MN, as assumed in Section 3.1. We
leave online estimation of the covert channel parameters from the
MN side as future work.
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4.4 Oset-Based Covert Channel
e idea of the oset-based covert channel is very similar to the
IAT-based covert channel (Figure 5). e main dierence is that
the former performs running average on IATs (including the added
deviations) to smooth out the noise, while the later aims to accu-
mulate the deviations to dierentiate the modulated samples from
noise. Our observations about clock osets are as follows.
Observations. According to our timing model in Section 3.1 and
Eq. (1), we have ti =
∑i
j=1 ∆tj , a0 = η0, and ai = ti/(1 + S) +
ηi . Since the receiver only knows the nominal period (T ) of the
targeted message, it computes the observed clock oset as the
dierence between the expected elapsed time (up to message i) at
the transmier and the actual elapsed time at the receiver, i.e.,
Oˆi = iT − (ai − a0) = iT − 11 + S
i∑
j=1
∆tj + η0 − ηi .
As we can see, if the transmier adds δ to L consecutive ITTs
(∆tj = T + δ for j = 1, ...,L), the deviations will accumulate and
lead to a decrease of δL/(1 + S) in Oˆi . Hence, by monitoring the
changes in Oˆi , the receiver can determine the transmied bits and
extract Am from clock osets. e above observations motivate
our design of oset-based covert channels.
Embedding Am into ITTs. Dierent from the IAT-based covert
channel (Section 4.3), the transmier embeds each bit of Af into L
consecutive ITTs as follows,
∆tj =

T − δ , if bi = 0,
T + δ , if bi = 1,
T , else,
for j ∈ [iL, (i + 1)L), and
∆tj =

T + δ , if bi = 0,
T − δ , if bi = 1,
T , else,
for j ∈ [iL + L/2, (i + 1)L), where L is assumed to be an even
integer. In other words, in order to transmit a bit 0/1, the transmier
adds −δ /δ to the rst L/2 ITTs and then subtracts −δ /δ from the
following L/2 ITTs so that the observed clock oset returns to the
reference level aer the transmission of each bit.
Extracting Am from Osets. On the receiver side, the monitor
node records the arrival timestamps and processes the IATs in
batches. Since each Af has nf bits and each bit is modulated into
L consecutive ITTs, a total number of N = nf L consecutive IATs
belong to the same Af , where N is referred to as the batch size.
Denote the i-th IAT in the k-batch as ∆ak,i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
en the observed clock oset with respect to the beginning of the
current batch up to the i-th IAT is
Oˆk [i] = iT −
i∑
j=1
∆ak, j .
Let κ = (max(Oˆk [i]) + min(Oˆk [i]))/2 be the midpoint (assuming
that at least a bit 0 and a bit 1 are transmied), which is considered
as the reference level of clock osets. Since clock skew is usually
very small (100s of ppm) and we are computing batch-wise clock
osets, the impact of clock skew is small, and thus we assume that
the κ is constant for the duration of a batch3. Since each bit aects
L IATs, the receiver needs to sample {Oˆk [i]} every L values with a
sampling oset of τ and obtain the j-th sample as Oˆk [jL + τ ]. If τ
is correctly chosen, then the total distance between each sample
and the reference level should be maximized, i.e.,
τ ∗ = arg max
τ
∑
j
|Oˆk [jL + τ ] − κ |.
en the receiver converts the sampled values to bits through the
following threhsolding-based scheme,
bˆj =

0, if Oˆk [jL + τ ∗] > Γu ,
1, if Oˆk [jL + τ ∗] < Γl ,
, else,
where Γl = κ − 14δL and Γu = κ + 14δL are the lower and upper
thresholds, respectively, and “ ” is the silence bit. e term of
1
4δL is due to the fact that δ is added to (or subtracted from) L/2
consecutive ITTs, and thus the maximum total deviation is ± 12δL.
e midpoints between κ and κ ± 12δL are chosen as thresholds.
Eventually, Am is extracted by concatenating all decoded bits and
spliing them at the silence bits.
Impact on CAN bus schedulability. As we have shown, in both
the IAT-based and oset-based covert channels, a certain amount
of deviation is added to the ITTs. As a result, it may increase the
worst-case response time of CAN messages, which is dened as the
longest time from the initiating event (that puts the message in the
transmission queue) occurring to the message being received by
the nodes that require it. If we apply the schedulability analysis in
[9] to TACAN, we can show that the eect of TACAN is equiva-
lent to increasing the blocking delay by a constant amount of time
(hundreds of µs) and increasing the message transmission time by a
small percentage. erefore, to achieve eective use of covert chan-
nels, TACAN parameters need to be experimentally obtained and
ne tuned prior to deployment to ensure the schedulability of the
CAN bus. A more detailed discussion is provided in Appendix A.2.
4.5 LSB-Based Covert Channel
In this section, we introduce a storage-based covert channel that
embeds the authentication messages inside the LSBs of the data
payload of normal CAN messages transmied by an ECU, referred
to as the LSB-based covert channel (Figure 7). Unlike the timing-
based covert channels, the LSB-based covert channel can be applied
to aperiodic CAN messages. For the scope of this work, we use the
CAN data frames to develop our methodology.
Observations. In order to transmit an authentication message over
the CAN bus, it is very common to make use of the existing elds
of a CAN message, such as the data eld [13, 14, 20] (at least one
byte) and the extended ID eld [14], or simply introduce additional
CAN messages [13, 14]. In practice, however, if all bytes in the data
eld have been used or the CAN bus is already heavily loaded, then
the existing approaches of exploiting CAN messages may disrupt
the ECU’s functionality or increase arbitration delays.
3In the case of very large clock skew (e.g., 1000s of ppm), there will be a linear trend
due to clock skew in batch-wise clock osets and thus the reference level may not be
constant. We leave the detrending process of clock osets as future work.
TACAN: Transmier Authentication through Covert Channels in Controller Area Networks ICCPS’19, April 2019, Montreal, Canada
CAN data frame
data field
…01011001
ECU Monitor Node
Embed 𝑨𝒎
in LSBs
𝑨𝒎
Extract 𝑨𝒎
from LSBs
secret msg 
reconstruction 𝒊𝒇 = 𝒊𝒇 ≠
OK Alert
C
A
N
 BU
S
TX RX
𝑨𝒎
…01011001
𝑨'𝒎 𝑨'𝒎 = 𝑨𝒎?
Figure 7: Illustration of LSB-based covert channel. e trans-
mitting ECU embeds the authentication message into the
LSBs of multiple normal CAN messages (with the same ID),
which can be extracted and veried by the Monitor Node.
Dierent from existing schemes that aempt to authenticate
messages, our transmier authentication scheme aims to authenti-
cate the transmier instead of each message. Hence, authentication
messages are transmied much less frequently, which means that
authentication bits may be spread over multiple CAN messages,
using only a few bits from each CAN message. Moreover, having
realized that certain CAN messages are used to carry sensor values
and most of them are oating numbers, we may use the L LSBs
(e.g., L = 1 or 2) for authentication purposes without causing sig-
nicant degradation in accuracy. Taking the Toyota Camry as an
example, there are at least 7 messages out of 42 that carry sensor
values (e.g., wheel speeds, engine speed, vehicle speed, odometer,
brake pressure, steering angle) [8]. We would expect more CAN
messages that carry sensor values in newer automobiles. e above
observations motivate our design of LSB-based covert channels.
Embedding Am to LSBs. e embedding process is implemented
as a sub-layer between the Application and the Data Link layers.
For each message Am (plus a known preamble to indicate the start
and end of Am ), it substitutes the least signicant L bits of the CAN
message with the next L bits in Am . No modication is needed if
the L bits happen to be the same.
Extracting Am from LSBs. On the receiver side, the MN extracts
the L LSBs from the received CAN messages and reconstructs the
authentication message. If the MN fails to verify the authentication
message, it will raise an alert that indicates possible compromise of
the transmiing ECU or malicious exploitation of the CAN bus.
As in the case of timing-based covert channels, we assume that
the seings for the LSB-based covert channel are pre-shared be-
tween each ECU and the MN during production and updated during
maintenance if necessary. More details about the embedding and
extraction processes are provided in Appendix A.3.
5 SECURITY DISCUSSION
Compared to the existing message authentication schemes [14, 20,
26, 33] that aempt to verify the authenticity of each message,
TACAN extracts and veries authentication message embedded in
the timing or LSBs of normal messages to authenticate the transmit-
ting ECU and also serves the purpose of intrusion detection. Hence,
TACAN can detect aacks that interrupt the transmission of normal
CAN messages (e.g., suspension, injection, and DoS aacks), as well
as aacks in which aackers fail to generate valid authentication
messages (e.g., forgery, replay, and masquerade aacks). e above
security properties provided by TACAN are independent of the
CAN protocol and the contents of CAN messages.
Security Features. We summarize a list of features provided by
TACAN as follows: 1) TACAN securely stores both master and
session keys in the ECU’s TPM to prevent being compromised by
the adversary, 2) TACAN employs monotonic counters for generat-
ing session keys and authentication messages for each ECU, and 3)
TACAN requires each ECU to continuously transmit unique authen-
tication messages to enable real-time transmier authentication.
Note that due to the third feature, if the aacker compromises
an in-vehicle ECU but does not aempt to deceive TACAN (i.e.,
stop generating authentication messages), it will interrupt the con-
tinuous transmission of authentication messages and thus will be
detected immediately. In addition, since basic aacks like suspen-
sion, injection, and DoS aacks can be easily detected, we focus on
more sophisticated aacks in the rest of this section that actively
aempt to evade TACAN, including the forgery aack, the replay
aack, and the masquerade aack.
Detecting Forgery Attacks. In the forgery aack, the adversary
has already compromised an in-vehicle ECU that is protected by
TACAN and aempts to generate valid authentication messages
that can be veried by the MN in order to evade the detection of
TACAN. Since our adversary model (Section 3.2) assumes that the
aacker has no access to the TPM of the compromised ECU, the
aacker has to forge a valid digest for each local counter value
without the session key. With a condensed digest of M bits, the
probability of a successful forgery is 1/2M . For example, when
M = 8, this probability is 1/28 ≈ 0.4%. Repeated forgeries will be
prevented due to the use of monotonic counters.
Detecting Replay Attacks. A replay aacker has inltrated the
CAN bus and aempts to replay previously transmied authenti-
cation messages of the targeted ECU with the hope of passing the
verication process at the MN. It is easy to see that such aempts
will be detected by TACAN due to the use of monotonic counters.
Detecting Masquerade Attacks. As mentioned in Section 3.2,
a masquerade aack (including the more sophisticated cloaking
aack [28]) requires in-vehicle ECUs to be weakly and/or fully
compromised. As a result, TACAN will force the aacker to perform
a forgery or replay aack, not only for the compromised ECU
itself, but also for the ECU the aacker aempts to masquerade as.
erefore, a masquerade aack will be detected by TACAN.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we implement the proposed covert channels on the
testbed and report their performance in terms of the throughput and
bit error ratio using the datasets collected from two real vehicles, a
2010 Toyota Camry [8] and a 2016 Chevrolet Camaro (University of
Washington EcoCAR) [10]. Testbed validation is in Section 6.1, then
the evaluations of covert channels IAT-based, oset-based, and LSB-
based are in Section 6.2, Section 6.3, and Section 6.4, respectively.
6.1 Testbed Validation
As shown in Figure 8, our EcoCAR testbed consists of the UW Eco-
CAR and two testbed ECUs, which are connected via the On-Board
Diagnostics (OBD-II) port. e UW EcoCAR hosts 8 stock ECus
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TX RX OBD-II Port
Figure 8: EcoCAR testbed. Two Raspberry Pi-based ECUs
are connected to the OBD-II port at the back of the EcoCAR,
one as the transmitter and the other one as the receiver.
and two experimental ECUs. ere are a total of 2500+ messages
using 89 dierent messages IDs are exchanged on the CAN bus
every second. Each ECU consists of a Raspberry Pi 3 and a PiCAN
2 board (using a MCP2515 CAN controller and a MCP2551 CAN
transceiver). e SocketCAN [29] library is used to enable the
interaction between the added ECUs and the UW EcoCAR.
In order to demonstrate the proposed covert channels, we imple-
mented them in Python in the transmier and collected the CAN
data traces using the receiver. Since the LSB-based covert channel
is expected to have a very small bit error ratio, we focus on the
timing-based (IAT-based and oset-based) covert channels. As an
example, we set nm = 36 bits (length of authentication message)
with alternating bit values and ns = 4 bits (number of silence bits).
Hence, each authentication frame is nf = 40 bits long. In order to
avoid any conict with existing messages, we chose a non-existent
message ID of 0x180 and set the message period T = 10 ms and
δ = 0.2 ms (2% of T ). While a non-existent message ID was used
in our experiments, we assumed the Raspberry Pi-based ECU as
a stock ECU that transmits messages with ID=0x180 and that is
capable of modifying the timing of message ITTs. We would like to
emphasize that TACAN does not require a new message ID or addi-
tional CAN messages to implement the proposed covert channels.
Figure 9 provides an example of observed IATs in the IAT-based
covert channel. As we can see, without running average, the modu-
lated IATs are noisy, and thresholding at the receiver side may lead
to many possible bit errors (Figure 9(a)). In contrast, the running
average process can eectively reduce IAT variations, making the
peaks and valleys of the modulated IATs clearly stand out, which
indicates a smaller probability of bit errors (Figure 9(b)).
An example of observed osets in the oset-based covert channel
is provided in Figure 10. As we can see, unlike the IAT-based covert
channel, increasing L in the oset-based covert channel eectively
increases the accumulated amount of deviations in osets at the
receiver side and thus reduces the bit error probability. In the rest
of this section, we evaluate each covert channel in more detail.
6.2 Evaluation of IAT-Based Covert Channel
In this section, we evaluate the performance of IAT-based covert
channels in terms of throughput and bit error ratio.
roughput. Given nm bits for Am , ns silence bits, and a window
length of L, the time it takes for a CAN message with period T to
transmit an authentication frame Af is Tf = (nm + ns )LT , which
increases linearly as function of L and T . en the throughput or
rate for transmiing Am is rm = nm/Tf bits per second (bps). For
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Time (# of Messages)
9.4
9.6
9.8
10.0
10.2
10.4
10.6
In
te
r-
A
rr
iv
al
 T
im
e 
(m
s)
Reference level
Lower threshold
Upper threshold
(a)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Time (# of Messages)
9.4
9.6
9.8
10.0
10.2
10.4
10.6
In
te
r-
A
rr
iv
al
 T
im
e 
(m
s)
Reference level
Lower threshold
Upper threshold
(b)
Figure 9: Example of observed IATs in IAT-based covert
channels (a) without and (b) with running average (L = 4).
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Figure 10: Example of observed osets in oset-based covert
channels with (a) L = 4 and (b) L = 8.
example, suppose that nm = 36, ns = 4, and L = 4. en we have
Tf = 1.6 sec for T = 0.01 sec and rm = 36/1.6 = 22.5 bps.
Bit Error Ratio. e bit error ratio is dened as the number of bit
errors divided by the total number of bits transmied in a given time
interval. In order to evaluate the bit error ratio of IAT-based covert
channels on real vehicles, we collected data for six representative
messages (including message 0x180 that was transmied from the
testbed ECU) with dierent ID levels, periods, and noise levels
from the Toyota Camry [8] and the UW EcoCAR [10], as shown in
Table 2. e same EcoCAR dataset was used in [35]. Note that IAT
noise is quantied in terms of the standard deviation (normalized
by the period) and the range (the dierence between the maximum
IAT and the minimum IAT, normalized by the period).
Table 2: Selected set of representative messages.
Msg ID Period(ms)
Standard dev.
(Normalized)
Range
(Normalized) Source
0x020 10 1.1% 10.2% Toyota
0x224 30 0.9% 4.8% Toyota
0x0D1 10 2.7% 51.5% EcoCAR
0x180 10 1.7% 30.1% EcoCAR
0x185 20 1.3% 22.6% EcoCAR
0x22A 100 1.2% 6.4% EcoCAR
In this experiment, we rst preprocess the data trace of each
message to ll in any missing messages. We set nm = 36 bits and
ns = 4 bits, and thus each frame is 40 bits long. Note that the
choices of nm and ns are not critical here, since we focus on the
bit error ratio instead of the frame error ratio. Out of 100 frames
(100nm bits in total), the number of bit errors (bˆj , bj ) is recorded
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Figure 11: Bit error ratios of IAT-based covert channel for
dierent CAN messages as a function of window length (L).
and divided by the number of transmied bits to obtain the bit
error ratio. e amount of deviation δ is xed to 2% of the message
period (T ). Since clock skews are small, we directly add δ to IATs
to simulate the eect of adding the same amount to ITTs at the
transmier side.
As illustrated in Figure 11, the performance of IAT-based covert
channel varies a lot among dierent messages, depending on their
noise levels. In general, the bit error ratios are very high with L = 1,
but they quickly drop to 0 as L increases for all messages, which
demonstrates the eectiveness of running average. Moreover, we
observe that messages with a large IAT range (e.g., 0x180, 0x0D1
and 0x185) tend to require a large L value to establish a reliable
IAT-based covert channel. With L = 6, all messages have a bit error
ratio of less than 0.1%.
6.3 Evaluation of Oset-Based Covert Channel
Since the throughput analysis of oset-based covert channels is
the same with that of IAT-based covert channels, we focus on the
bit error performance in this experiment using the same setup in
Section 6.2. Results are provided in Figure 12.
As we can see, the performance of oset-based covert channels
again depends on the characteristics of individual messages. When
L = 4, the bit error ratio is less than 1% for messages 0x224, 0x185,
and 0x22A. As L increases, added deviations accumulate at the
receiver side, thus eectively reducing the bit error ratio. With
L = 8, the bit error ratio has dropped to less than 0.42% for all
messages. As compared to the IAT-based covert channel, the oset-
based covert channel is less ecient and requires a larger L value.
is is mainly because it adds deviations to only the rst half of L
consecutive ITTs, and the second half is used only for the purpose of
maintaining the reference level for clock osets, which contributes
very lile in dierentiating the modulated samples from the noise.
6.4 Evaluation of LSB-Based Covert Channel
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the LSB-based covert
channel in terms of throughput, bit error ratio, and accuracy loss.
roughput. Given nm bits for Am and ns bits for the start se-
quence, it takes Tf = nf T /L = (nm + ns )T /L sec to transmit an
authentication frame Af using L LSBs of a CAN message with
period T . en the throughputs for transmiing Af and Am are
rf = nf /Tf and rm = nm/Tf , respectively. For example, suppose
4 6 8 10 12 14
Window Length (L)
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
B
it 
E
rr
or
 R
at
io
 (%
) 0x020
0x224
0x0D1
0x180
0x185
0x22A
Figure 12: Bit error ratios of oset-based covert channels for
dierent CAN messages as a function of window length (L).
that ns = 36, ns = 4,T = 0.01 sec and L = 2. en we haveTf = 0.2
sec, rf = 40/0.2 = 200 bps, and rm = 36/0.2 = 180 bps.
Bit Error Ratio. Since the LSB-based covert channel embeds the
authentication message into the data payload of normal CAN mes-
sages, its bit error ratio will be as small as that of the CAN bus
itself. According to [11], the bit error ratios of CAN in normal en-
vironments (factory production line) and aggressive environments
(two meters away from a high-frequency arc-welding machine) are
3.1 × 10−7% and 2.6 × 10−5%, respectively.
Accuracy Loss. As the LSB-based covert channel modies the LSBs
in the data elds of CAN data frames, such modication will lead
to accuracy loss of sensor values. With changes of one LSB (L = 1),
the accuracy loss of the same scale with the resolution (or the
discretization error) of that sensor value. Increasing L will result
in larger throughput and accuracy loss. Hence, manufacturers
will need to assess the impact of accuracy loss in CAN data on
the functionality and safety, as well as trade o the accuracy loss
against throughput when deploying the LSB-based covert channel.
It is important to highlight that for periodic messages that cannot
tolerate accuracy loss, manufacturers may deploy IAT-based and
oset-based covert channels instead.
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed LSB-
based covert channel, we consider two CAN messages: 1) the wheel
velocity value based on the publicly available Toyota dataset [8]
and 2) the engine coolant temperature value that we identied
through reverse engineering from the EcoCAR dataset [10]. In our
experiments, we set L to 1 or 2 and quantify the accuracy loss in
terms of the maximum error (using the original values as ground
truth). Note that we intentionally keep L ≤ 2 in order to avoid
signicant distortions to the underlying sensor values or jeopardize
the functionality of the receiving ECU.
As illustrated in Figure 13 and highlighted in the magnied box,
the maximum error introduced to wheel velocity is 0.01 km/h for
L = 1 and 0.03 km/h for L = 2, which is very insignicant. As for the
engine coolant temperature as shown in Figure 14, the maximum
error is 1 ◦C for L = 1 and 3 ◦C for L = 2, which are still moderate.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we introduced TACAN, a transmier authentication
scheme using covert channels for the CAN bus, that allows a MN
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Figure 13: Authentication message embedded in Toyota
wheel velocity data with L = 1 and with L = 2.
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Figure 14: Authenticationmessage embedded in EcoCAR en-
gine coolant temperature data with L = 1 and with L = 2.
to verify the authenticity of the transmiing ECU. We developed
IAT-based, oset-based, and LSB-based covert channels to commu-
nicate the authentication information between ECUs and the MN
without introducing protocol modications or trac overheads.
We provided a security discussion for TACAN and demonstrated
the proposed covert channels through testbed validation and ex-
perimental evaluation. Our future work will include experimental
evaluation of TACAN under various aacks against the CAN bus.
In addition, we will also improve the throughput of the proposed
covert channels and explore hybrid covert channel schemes.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 CAN Frame
As illustrated in Figure 15, each CAN frame or message has a set
of predened elds, including the Start of Frame (SOF) eld, the
Arbitration eld (including a 11-bit message ID for the base frame
format or a 29-bit message ID for the extended frame format), the
Control eld, the Data eld (8-64 bits), the CRC eld, the ACK eld,
and the End of Frame (EOF) eld.
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Figure 15: Illustration of CAN frame structure.
A.2 Impact on CAN Bus Schedulability
In order to understand the impact of TACAN on CAN bus schedu-
lability, we apply the schedulability analysis in [9]. For the ease
of discussion, we provide a summary of denitions as below. e
same notations in [9] are used for consistency.
• m: Message priority (used interchangeably with message
ID).
• Cm : Transmission time, dened as the longest time that
the message can take to be transmied.
• Jm : euing jier, dened as the longest time between the
initiating event and the message being queued, ready to be
transmied on the bus.
• wm : euing delay, dened as the longest time that the
message can remain in the CAN controller slot or device
driver queue, before commencing successful transmission
on the bus.
• Tm : Message period, dened as the minimum inter-arrival
time of the event that triggers queueing of the message.
Such events may occur strictly periodically with a period
of Tm or sporadically with a minimum separation of Tm .
• Rm : Worst-case response time of message m, dened as
the longest time from the initiating event occurring to the
message being received by the nodes that require it.
• Dm : Hard deadline, dened as the maximum permied
time from occurrence of the initiating event to the end of
successful transmission of the message.
A message is schedulable if and only if its worst-case response time is
no greater than its deadline (Rm ≤ Dm ). A CAN bus is schedulable
if and only if all messages on the CAN bus are schedulable.
As per [9], we haveCm = (80+10sm )τbit (including bit stung),
where sm is the number of data bytes and τbit is the transmission
time of a single bit. For a 8-byte message on a 500 kbps CAN bus,
we have τbit = 2 µs and Cm = 320 µs. While CAN nodes typically
have separate clock sources, all the timing quantities (e.g., message
jiers, bit times, message periods, and deadlines) that derived from
node clocks will be converted to real-time.
e messagem’s worst-case response time Rm is given by
Rm = Jm +wm +Cm , (4)
and the queuing delay wm consists of two elements:
• Blocking Bm , due to lower priority messages being trans-
mied when message m is queued, and
• Interference due to higher priority messages which may win
arbitration and be transmied in preference to messagem.
e blocking delay Bm is given by Bm = maxk ∈lp(m)(Ck ), where
lp(m) is the set of messages with lower priority thanm.
In order to analyze the worst-case response times, it is important
to characterize the busy period, in which all messages of priority
m or higher, queued strictly before the end of busy period, are
transmied during the busy period. e maximal busy period
begins with a so-called critical instant where messagem is queued
simultaneously with all higher priority messages and then each of
these higher priority messages is subsequently queued again aer
the shortest possible time interval.
For simplicity, we assume that only one instance of messagem
is transmied during a priority level-m busy period. In this case,
the worst-case queuing delay is given by:
wm = Bm +
∑
∀k ∈hp(m)
⌈
wm + Jk + τbit
Tk
⌉
Ck . (5)
Since the right hand side is a monotonic non-decreasing function of
wm , Eq. (5) can be solved using the following recurrence relation,
wn+1m = Bm +
∑
∀k ∈hp(m)
⌈
wnm + Jk + τbit
Tk
⌉
Ck . (6)
A suitable starting value is w0m = Bm , and the recurrence relation
iterates until, either Jm +wn+1m +Cm > Dm , i.e., the message is not
schedulable, or wn+1m = wnm , in which case the worst-case response
of messagem is given by Jm +wn+1m +Cm .
In order to apply the above schedulability analysis to TACAN,
we dene T ′m = Tm − δ . Since TACAN adds at most δ to each ITT,
which can be considered as part of the queuing delay, we have
J ′m = Jm + δ . Assume that δ = 0.02Tm and all messages employ
the timing-based covert channel. By substituting T ′m = 0.98Tm and
J ′m = Jm + 0.02Tm into Eq. (6), we have
w
′n+1
m = Bm +
∑
∀k ∈hp(m)
⌈
w
′n
m + (Jk + 0.02Tk ) + τbit
0.98Tk
⌉
Ck
≈ B′m +
∑
∀k ∈hp(m)
⌈
w
′n
m + Jk + τbit
Tk
⌉
C ′k , (7)
where
B′m = Bm +
∑
∀k ∈hp(m)
(
0.02
0.98Ck
)
, (8)
and
C ′k =
1
0.98Ck = 1.02Ck . (9)
erefore, the eect of TACAN on schedulability is equivalent
to increasing the blocking delay by a constant amount of time and
increasing the message transmission time by a certain percentage.
For example, if we assume 45 messages with higher priority (half
messages in the EcoCAR), the increase in the blocking delay and
message transmission time is 294 µs and 6.5 µs (Cm = 320 µs),
respectively. By solving Eq. (7), we can compute the corresponding
worst-case response time of message m with TACAN. Hence, to
achieve eective use of covert channels, TACAN parameters need
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to be experimentally obtained and ne tuned prior to deployment
to ensure the schedulability of the CAN bus.
A.3 LSB-Based Covert Channel Algorithms
In this section, we describe the authentication message embed-
ding and extraction algorithms for the LSB-Based covert channel
methodology. e related notations are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Notation of LSB-based covert channel algorithms.
Notation Description
α Start sequence
Am Authentication (secret) message
Af Authentication frame
df ield (·) Data eld of CAN data frame
γ Selected bytes (value)
bin(·)L Least signicant L bits
e embedding procedure is described in Algorithm 1. For each
Am , a known preamble (a particular bit sequence) is rst appended
to the beginning of Am that allows the receiver to determine the
start of Am . We assume that the authentication messages are gen-
erated and transmied continuously. Hence, the start of the next
Am indicates the end of the previous one. Whenever new data
eld content df ield is received from the upper (Application) layer,
the least signicant L bits of selected values in df ield (denoted as
bin(df ield (γ ))L) are compared with the next L bits of Af : if the
bits of interest are dierent then the substitution occurs, otherwise
df ield is not modied. e same process is then repeated for each
new authentication sequence.
Algorithm 1: Embedding Am to LSBs
Input :Am , L
Af ← α | |Am ; i ← 0;
while i < lenдth(Af ) do
Receive df ield from the upper (Application) layer;
if bin(df ield (γ ))L , Af [i : i + L − 1] then
bin(df ield (γ ))L = Af [i : i + L − 1];
i ← i + L;
Send df ield to the lower (Data Link) layer;
return;
e extracting procedure is described in Algorithm 2. When the
MN receives a targeted CAN message, it lters for the Data frame
and extracts from the df ield the L LSBs. Once a valid start sequence
is detected, the MN starts storing the bits in Aˆf and comparing
the newly arrived bits against the expected Af . In this way, it
is possible to check possible inconsistency of the authentication
sequence received also before the complete reception of Af to
shorten the verication time. If the actual value stored in Aˆf is
not equal to part of the bits in Af , an alert is raised highlighting
a possible compromise of specic ECU or malicious exploitation
of the CAN bus. Once the Af is entirely received, the MN starts to
extract the next authentication message.
Algorithm 2: Extracting Am from LSBs
Input :Am , L
Af ← α | |Am ; i ← 0;
while i < lenдth(Af ) do
Receive df ield from the Data Layer layer;
// Process df ield in the Application layer;
Aˆf [i : i + L − 1] = bin(df ield (γ ))L ;
if Aˆf [i : i + L − 1] , Af [i : i + L − 1] then
Alert = True;
i ← i + L;
return;
